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“The unmasking of modern science” – the sequel (I) 
In 1982, T.M. Moore claimed that positivism was in the process 
of being “unmasked”. Its shortcomings were being unmasked 
by its enemies as well as by its adherents. In describing the 
process of unmasking, Moore resorted to T.S. Kuhn’s 
sociological theory of normal science, paradigms, crises and 
revolutions. Moore then went on to challenge the Christian 
scholarly community to (inter alia) develop a new paradigm for 
science. Now, after just more than two decades have elapsed 
since this exhortation by Moore, a survey had to be done to see 
to what extent the secular as well as the Christian community 
has taken up the challenge and how both of them have 
progressed in the directions that Moore had predicted. It has 
also become time for the Christian community to assess its own 
progress towards developing a “new” scientific paradigm. In this 
article, the first part of a two-part article on this subject, the 
author concludes that modern science has not only surrendered 
the positivistic search for universal foundations and truth, but 
has become characterised by secularism, postmodern fragmen-
tation and a preference for contingent foundations. 
Opsomming 
“The unmasking of modern science” – die vervolg (I) 
In 1982 het T.M. Moore die stelling gewaag dat die positivisme 
in ’n proses van “ontmaskering” vasgevang was. Die tekort-
kominge daarvan is destyds blootgelê deur sowel die vyande as 
die aanhangers daarvan. In sy pogings om die ontmaskering te 
beskryf het Moore gebruik gemaak van T.S. Kuhn se sosio-
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logiese teorie van normale wetenskap, paradigmas, krisisse en 
revolusies. Moore het sy uiteensetting beëindig met ’n uitdaging 
aan die Christelike wetenskapsgemeenskap om na vore te kom 
met ’n eie nuwe paradigma vir wetenskapsbeoefening. Nou, 
nadat net meer as twee dekades verloop het sedert Moore 
hierdie oproep gedoen het, het die tyd aangebreek om ’n 
opname te maak van hoe die sekulêre sowel as die Christelike 
wetenskap gevorder het op die pad wat Moore voorspel het. So 
’n oorsig bied ook aan die Christelike wetenskapsgemeenskap 
die geleentheid om bestek op te neem oor die ontwikkeling van 
’n eie nuwe paradigma vir wetenskapsbeoefening. In hierdie 
artikel, die eerste deel van ’n tweedelige artikel oor die 
onderwerp, kom die outeur tot die gevolgtrekking dat moderne 
wetenskap nie net die positivistiese strewe na universele 
grondslae en waarheid laat vaar het nie, maar ook gekenmerk 
word deur sekularisme, postmoderne fragmentering en ’n 
voorkeur vir kontingente grondslae. 
1. Introductory remarks 
Just more than two decades ago, T.M. Moore (1982) published a 
study entitled The unmasking of modern science. The purpose of 
this publication was  
to examine some of the indications of this unmasking in the 
writings of various religious critics and secular scientists. We 
hope to point out an important weakness in the theoretical 
foundation of modern science and to call evangelical scientists, 
teachers, preachers, scholars and concerned laymen to a 
concerted effort to exploit that weakness unto the creation of an 
entirely new paradigm for scientific activity (Moore, 1982:70). 
At the time of publication, Moore was able to conclude that “the 
unmasking of modern science has begun”, and that “clearly the 
bastion of modern science is under assault, both from without and 
within” (Moore, 1982:71, 83). He also concluded that the scientific 
enterprise was being forced to examine itself and to face up to 
inconsistencies, contradictions and anomalies for which it could give 
no answers which satisfy its own criteria for validity. Thus, he 
thought, it was possible that modern science might be entering – or 
might be forced to enter – a period of crisis such as in the past has 
preceded a paradigm shift, a major alteration in the generally-
accepted view of science and the scientific method. And, finally, he 
contended: “... if this is true, then this is indeed an opportune 
moment for Christians involved in that field of endeavour” (Moore, 
1982:84). 
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He called on Christian scholars to apply their energies and efforts to 
three tasks: 
• In the first place, there must be a continuing effort to expose the 
fallacies and inconsistencies of the secular and evolutionary 
approach to science. 
• Second, there must begin a widespread yet highly organised 
effort to construct a comprehensive paradigm for scientific activity 
based upon the Biblical worldview. 
• Finally, there must be a sustained and concerted evangelistic 
effort into the lost world, including among secular scientists. A 
Biblical view of science, he said, would only make sense to those 
who had learned to trust in Jesus Christ and had received the gift 
of eternal life and the new perspective it provided (Moore, 
1982:85-86). 
2. The purpose of this two-part sequel to Moore’s study 
Moore’s study was published more than two decades ago. Since 
then, there have been several developments in the fields of 
philosophy and sociology of science and epistemology, in both 
“secular science” (Moore’s term) and “Christian scholarship” (cf. Van 
der Hoeven, 1995). As indicated above, Moore also set an agenda 
for Christian scholars in the process of further developing and 
expounding a Christian view of science and scholarship, i.e. a view 
based on a Biblical life-view or cosmology. The questions that 
confront one in this regard are: 
• How has the secular community of scientists/scholars responded 
to what Moore termed the “unmasking” of their paradigm? Did the 
members of this community indeed perceive the bastion of 
modern science to be under attack, that it was in crisis, and that a 
new paradigm was beginning to take shape? 
• How has the Christian community of scientists/scholars 
responded to the three-fold task that Moore outlined for them? 
Has Moore read the future correctly when he exhorted Christian 
scholars to “begin a widespread yet highly organized effort to 
construct a comprehensive paradigm for scientific activity based 
upon the Biblical world-view”? Were the philosophical, spiritual 
and cultural conditions in the world conducive to the creation of 
such a new and comprehensive paradigm? 
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In order to find answers to these two questions, a meta-study1 was 
undertaken. A large number of publications, from the pens and 
computers of secular scientists as well as of Christian scholars, 
have appeared in the last 25 years. A relatively large proportion of 
these take the form of single (wide-ranging) studies in which the 
authors expound their views with respect to specific aspects of 
philosophy and sociology of science and/or epistemology. In others, 
the authors developed a meta-analytical perspective with regards to 
recent developments in these disciplines. In other words, they 
describe recent developments, based on their own life- and 
worldviews and perceptions of what knowledge and science should 
achieve. In order to present a brief, coherent and consistent 
overview of developments in the fields of philosophy and sociology 
of science and epistemology (where applicable), and as a way of 
preventing the subject from becoming unmanageable because of 
too much detail, mainly the latter type of publications was consulted 
to put the following overview together.2 Its purpose, as has been 
mentioned, was to find answers to the two questions stated above. 
Since Moore ended his discussion of the crisis experienced by 
modern secular science with a discussion of Thomas Kuhn’s theory 
about scientific paradigms and the way crises occur in established 
scientific paradigms, this discussion will now continue from that point 
onwards. 
3. Kuhn, his supporters and his critics 
To make the point that “modern science” was in crisis, Moore 
employed Thomas S. Kuhn’s (1922-1996) views on how science 
historically developed, as expounded in the latter’s well-known 
publication The structure of scientific revolutions, first published in 
1962 (Kuhn, 1970; 1973). It has become a truism, says Fuller 
                                      
1 A meta-study (also: meta-analysis) is a scientific method in terms of which the 
analyses made by other scholars are analysed for the purpose of discovering a 
broader and consistent picture of occurences and developments (cf. Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2005:238). Apple (1999:344-345) calls this method “synthetic analyses 
that review a field” and also: “synthetic appraisals”. Jansen (2006:33) refers to it 
as “systematic reviews” or “research synthesis”. 
2  Because of the method followed, there will always be a measure of subjectivity 
in the writing of an article such as this. The author is constantly compelled to 
decide what to include and what to leave by the wayside. 
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(1997:11), to speak of Kuhn as having deposed the positivist image 
of inquiry.3
Kuhn’s historico-sociological analysis of how science evolved and 
developed indeed posed a threat to the optimistic and cumulative 
view of science held by positivists and empiricists, which was the 
dominant view of rationality for something like a century till the mid-
twentieth century4 (Fowler, 2004:52). Kuhn claimed that the most 
important changes in science were radically discontinuous, indeed a 
revolutionary transition between incommensurable paradigms. 
According to him, a group of scientists would accept, usually as a 
result of their training, as well as of their dogmatic initiation into the 
world of science, a particular paradigm as the obvious and natural 
framework5 within which they do their work as scientists. In some 
cases, they would tend to force reality to fit into the framework in 
which they are working. In other cases, they would attend only to the 
problems and puzzles which they are confronted with in terms of 
their theoretical framework or paradigm. Because working in that 
particular paradigm is deemed to be the “normal” way of doing 
science, they run the risk of overlooking other problems and puzzles 
(Mautner, 2000:300; Van den Beukel, 2000:13-16). 
In his study, Moore does not refer to the fact that Kuhn’s views were 
interpreted in different ways, to such an extent that Kuhn himself 
                                      
3 Neither Kuhn nor the positivists seemed to see matters this way, which is why 
Kuhn’s book The structure of scientific revolutions (1962/1970/1973) was 
published as the final instalment of the International Encyclopedia of Unified 
Science (Fuller, 1997:11). There is, of course, the possibility that Kuhn 
deliberately intended sabotaging positivism from the inside. In 2000, Kuhn 
(2000:91) stated that others like Paul Feyerabend, Russ Hanson, Mary Hesse, 
Michael Polanyi, Stephen Toulmin and a few others should also receive 
recognition for effecting the transition in the philosophy of science for which he 
received (all) the credit.  
4 During that period science, redefined as the systematic ordering of indubitable 
sensory observations by a universally valid rational method, was seen as the 
basis for a universal certainty (Fowler, 2004:52). 
5 Kuhn (1962/1973:43 ff.) uses the term paradigm in a wide range of meanings 
(cf. Masterman, 1970:59 ff.; Godfrey-Smith, 2003:75-79). He uses it at times to 
refer to a “set of commitments”, then again to refer to a view of reality, or to a 
scientific tradition or to a theoretical framework. According to Godfrey-Smith 
(2003:76), Kuhn initially seems to have preferred to attach a “looser” or more 
common meaning to the term, viz. that it referred to a broad framework within 
which a particular group of specialist scientists worked. Later on, in response to 
his critics, he limited the meaning of the term to “disciplinary matrix” or 
“exemplar” (cf. Kuhn, 1970:271-272).  
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lamented in 1970 that his critics seemed to read the publications of 
a “Kuhn1” as well as of a “Kuhn2” (Kuhn, 1970:231). After studying 
the works of his critics (including Popper, Feyerabend, Lakatos, 
Toulmin, Watkins and Masterman – see Lakatos & Musgrave, 
1970), he concluded that the misunderstanding of his work should 
be blamed on inadequate communication. He also concluded that 
there were at least three sets of issues that separated his critics 
from him: method, the problem of normal science and the fact that 
he was alleged to have accepted that the majority of the scholars 
working in a paradigm decided whether they were involved in 
“normal science” (“mob rule”) (Kuhn, 1970:234). Without entering 
into the detail of his defence with respect to “method”, it is important 
to note that Kuhn bases his views on how science works and 
evolves on sociological and historical analyses and insights (Kuhn, 
1970:240). Because of his insistence to look at science as a 
sociologist of science, he tends to analyse the community structure 
of science (Kuhn, 1970:252). The sociological base of his position 
highlights the extent to which he regards scientific knowledge as 
intrinsically a product of a congeries of specialists’ communities 
(Kuhn, 1970:253).  
Also important, in view of Moore’s study, is the fact that Kuhn 
consistently keeps mentioning the role of ideological commitment in 
science. A group of scientists working in a particular paradigm, for 
instance, must share certain ideological commitments if their 
enterprise is to succeed. Kuhn (1970:240) keeps on asking: “How 
will a particular constellation of beliefs, values, and imperatives 
affect group behaviour?” In his opinion, group behaviour will be 
affected decisively by the shared commitments, but the individual 
choices that members of the group make will be a function of 
personality, education, and the prior pattern of professional research 
(Kuhn, 1970:241). Different values lead to different conclusions and 
to different choices (for instance, with respect to the paradigm in 
which one decides to work). More important, though scientists share 
values (in the context of their paradigm) and must continue to do so 
if science is to survive, they do not all apply them in the same way. 
Simplicity, scope, fruitfulness and even accuracy can be judged 
quite differently (which is not to say that they may be judged 
arbitrarily) by different people. They may also differ in their 
conclusions without violating any accepted rule (of the paradigm) 
(Kuhn,1970:262). 
An important insight of Kuhn’s, and which he shares with Popper 
(Kuhn, 1970:242), is that all scientists necessarily develop their 
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ideas within a definite theoretical framework. Even scientific 
revolutions (when “normal” science becomes questioned) demand 
such frameworks, since they always involve the rejection and 
replacement of a framework or of some of its integral parts. “Since 
the science which I call normal is precisely research within a 
framework, it can only be the opposite side of a coin the face of 
which is revolutions” (Kuhn, 1970:242).  
He also conceded that Masterman was probably correct in her 
criticism that 
the term ‘paradigm’ points to the central philosophical aspect of 
my book but that its treatment there is badly confused. No 
aspect of my viewpoint has evolved more since the book was 
written, and her paper has helped in that development (Kuhn, 
1970:234).6
4. Post-Kuhnian developments 
There was in essence a two-fold reaction to Kuhn’s views. On the 
one hand, many philosophers of science thought that Kuhn was 
impugning the rationality, objectivity and progress of science. In his 
later writings (especially in the Postscript to the second edition of his 
book The structure of scientific revolutions) he tried to reassure 
them that this was not the case. On the other hand, sociologists of 
science and others anxious to debunk “modern science” (such as 
Moore and other Christian scholars) responded to Kuhn’s ideas with 
enthusiasm. So did some social thinkers who took Kuhn to be 
saying that to become truly scientific was to become dogmatically 
committed to some “paradigm” (Mautner, 2000:301). 
                                      
6  Hoyningen-Huene (1993:xv-xvi) points out that not only has the reception of 
Kuhn’s theory failed to do it justice, but also that his readers are far from 
agreeing on the precise content of his central theses and their validity. 
Interpretations of Kuhn are extraordinarily varied as a result of this. Kuhn 
himself admitted that weaknesses, obscurities, unclarity, vagueness, confusion, 
real difficulties, ambiguities, misunderstandings, substantive errors, and 
provisional formulations grounded in metaphor and intuition are all to be found 
both in Structure and in later works (also cf. Fuller, 2006:21-22). Hoyningen-
Huene makes these observations despite certain concerted efforts in 1990 on 
the part of Kuhn to clear up some of the (terminological) confusion (cf. Kuhn, 
2000:90-104). Hung (1997:387-390) is critical also of Kuhn’s concept of 
incommensurabiltity, the relativism of his stance, his unclear concept of 
meaning, his failure to distinguish clearly between generic theory and specific 
theory, the naturalistic epistemology underlying his views, and the fact that he 
thinks his paradigm view of science can be both descriptive and prescriptive. 
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Another tendency also seemed to have gained momentum after 
Structure, viz. the distinction/division between the public and the 
private domains of people’s lives. This “split” was reinforced by more 
pronounced secularism.7  
According to one dictionary, secularism refers to a doctrine in terms 
of which religion is rejected, especially in the realm of ethics; it can 
also refer to the view that religion has no place in civil affairs 
(Collins, 1999). Secularism is the process by which civil authority 
became autonomous from religious control, says Fuller (2000:399), 
and according to Fowler (2004:59), it created the illusion of a 
separation of rationality and religious faith. “Pre-secularist” science 
was based on tests of religious commitment, but secularism caused 
rationality to operate in science in isolation from religious faith.  
Secularism in science (and epistemology) occurred once the 
Enlightenment transformed the intellectual orientation of academic 
theology from the professional training of clerics to a form of critical 
inquiry conducted independent from religious authorities (Fuller, 
2000:210) and their grand narratives.8 Fowler (2002:34) agrees with 
the second meaning offered by the Collins dictionary when he says: 
“One of the greatest triumphs of secularism has been to banish 
belief in spiritual powers in relation to the world of secular reality, 
confining them to a separate realm”. In Van der Walt’s (1994:367) 
opinion, secularism can be regarded as a religion or an ideology in 
its own right – even as the “mother of all ideologies”. Secularism is a 
religion, ideology or alternative lifeview that possesses the power to 
ban all other religions from the public domain, and to install itself in 
their places as the only publicly acceptable religion. Like any other 
religion, secularism tends to determine everything in the lives of its 
adherents. All other religions, however, are relegated to the personal 
and private lives of their adherents (Van der Walt, 2004a:91-93; 94; 
96; also cf. Van der Walt, 2004b).  
The important point here, with respect to the topic under discussion, 
is that, in terms of secularism, a distinction (even a division) was 
made between the public and the private spheres of people’s lives. 
Science and scholarship, since they belong to the public lives of 
                                      
7 Van der Hoeven (1995:55-56) mentions a few other recent developments that 
either might have reinforced the split, or might be symptomatic of the split: 
postmetaphysical thinking, nihilism, pluralism and nomadism. 
8 Theological, religious and life-view systems. 
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people, have to remain neutral. Religion, since it belongs to the 
private domain of people’s lives, should therefore have no influence 
in the context of science and scholarship (Van der Walt, 2004a:93, 
95). Some members of the Christian community also accepted a 
dualist view of life in which a so-called secular realm existed 
alongside a religious realm (cf. discussions of secularism by 
McCarthy et al., 1981:83; De Ruyter, 1994; Barbour, 1997; Marsden, 
1997). 
As intimated, secularism, together with postmodernism and post-
structuralism,9 created a split between what can be regarded as 
public and what should be seen as private, individual or personal. 
Science as practised in the public domain, such as at public or state 
universities and colleges, should not be affected or contaminated in 
any way by religious commitments (such as those based, for 
instance, on the Bible or any other holy book) or by the concomitant 
life-view or cosmoscope (life-view) held by believers (belonging, for 
instance, to main-stream religions). Forms of science affected by 
religious commitment and faith assumptions are admissible only in 
private institutions of learning, such as private schools, colleges or 
universities. In such cases, the practising of science, and the 
training in these forms of life-conceptually determined science, 
should be privately funded (whereas training and tuition at public 
institutions can and should be publicly funded) (Van der Walt, 
2003:132-133). 
The divide between what is regarded as public and what as private 
explains why Christian scholars10 and their “secular” counterparts11 
tend to exploit the insights offered by Kuhn in quite different ways. 
Because both groups partially base their position about science on 
Kuhn’s ideas, they are still able to communicate with each other, 
although from different ideological bases or sets of commitments.  
Another development, viz. the appearance of a “postmodern mood 
or climate”, to borrow a phrase from Van der Hoeven (1995:55), 
serves as background for developments described in 5 below 
                                      
9 A school of thought which emerged in the late 1970s, claiming to supersede 
and/or to problematise the earlier structuralism. It is best understood as die 
French-inspired variant of the so-called “linguistic turn” (Honderich, 2005:745). 
10 Assumed to be plying their trade in the “private domain”. 
11 Assumed to be working in the “public domain”. 
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(piecemealism and constructivism). According to Van der Hoeven 
(1995:56), 
postmodernism is primarily the abandonment of ideals of the 
Enlightenment regarding its pretensions of true universality 
(scientific, societal, cultural), but also, more broadly, the 
definitive cessation of all ‘great stories’, especially the 
metaphysical and religious accounts. It substitutes for these 
small stories, the right of each individual to his or her’s; playing 
with ideas; subtle deconstruction of the inheritance that strove 
after universality or pretended to universality; pluralism as 
primary given. 
Postmodernism, according to Middleton and Walsh (1995:15, 19, 
35), rejected the progress ideal associated with neutral positivistic 
science, but also caused “total scheme of things”-approaches12 to 
become less acceptable. The practice of developing grand-scale 
narratives tended to become replaced by perspectival and problem-
centred approaches to science and to life in general (Middleton & 
Walsh, 1995:32; O’Loughlin, 1999:55 ff., 2000:55 ff.; Plantinga, 
1995:34). This new approach seemed to provide stimuli for the 
development of individual and social constructivism (Middleton & 
Walsh, 1995:37, 50) and relativism, inter alia because of rejecting 
foundationalism and objectivity/objectivism (cf. Plantinga, 1995:30-
31). According to Middleton and Walsh (1995:56), postmodernists 
do not require a grand narrative to help them determine direction in 
science or in life; they can decide for themselves what course to 
take. This view led, inter alia, to the supposition that whatever 
structure there was to anything was a product of the cognitive 
processes of the particular structurer, i.e. the person who knows and 
studies reality. Structure that is perceived in a phenomenon is solely 
the perceiver’s way of viewing things. All frameworks that give 
structure are open to question since they are nothing but individual 
points of view (Fowler, 2004:53).  
 
According to Fowler (2004), “consensus crumbled into dust”13 after 
                                      
12 Systematic discussions about phenomena or ideological positions. 
13 It is interesting to note that similar observations have been made in non-
Christian circles. Fuller (1997:2), for instance, observed that in the public 
understanding of science “the identity of science has become so unstable in the 
contemporary world that it makes sense to ask whether knowledge production is 
the primary social function of highly publicised pieces of research – such as the 
Human Genome Project and the Hubble Space telescope. There is no 
conception of scientific method unless one means the attempt to use one 
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repeated failure of attempts, especially by the logical positivists, to 
demonstrate the existence of a universal rational foundation for 
science. Klapwijk (1987:102) agrees with this when he concludes 
that modern philosophy “has developed into a critique of ideologies 
or has postured as a hermeneutics of suspicion”.14 This 
development, says Fowler (2004:53), is often attributed to the work 
of Thomas Kuhn, but he was neither the leader nor the most 
influential figure in bringing to an end the consensus about scientific 
reason as the basis for rational certainty. “A wide range of scholars, 
though differing on details, were united in the judgement that the 
basis on which that consensus rested was now decisively 
discredited ...”.  
While there remained some scholars who persisted in believing that 
scientific reason provided the universal certainty, significant 
numbers of well respected scholars rejected this belief as one 
having no rational foundation. There still remained those who 
continued to hold their belief that scientific reason provides rational 
certainties, but they could no longer claim to represent the generally 
accepted view about science and scholarship. They were now 
simply one faction among others. This did not mean, Fowler 
(2004:53) maintains, that there was any general rejection of 
scientific knowledge or of its value for human endeavour. It meant 
simply that this knowledge came to be seen as fallible with no 
rational basis for regarding it as having unique authority over and 
above all other sources of knowledge. 
Postmodernism is frequently portrayed in a rather negative light. In 
Fowler’s (2004:54) opinion, much of what has been said of 
postmodernism, especially from a Christian perspective, might be 
accurate, but there is also another side to postmodernism that is 
often overlooked. According to him, nothing is more characteristic of 
                                                                                                              
successful form of inquiry as the model for them all. Even then, success is a 
concept fraught with difficulties, involving a complicated relationship between 
science and its history.” 
14 Or, he adds, it has simply presented itself as a continuation of the conversation 
of the West (Richard Rorty). Plantinga (1995:30 ff.) is convinced that (logical) 
positivism was replaced by a new “two-headed” monster: on the one hand 
“perennial naturalism” which insists that everything should be understood in 
naturalistic and evolutionistic terms, and on the other, “creative anti-realism” 
which insists that everything be explained in constructivist terms, and insists on 
the autonomy of the human being. These new developments are just as 
opposed to Christian ways of thinking as (logical) positivism, but they are 
perhaps more dangerous because they are much more plausible. 
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the postmodern world than cultural diversity and contrast. The 
negativity that postmodernism is sometimes depicted exists side by 
side with more positive aspects such as viewing the world as full of 
promise and possibilities. It is a world of new freedom for the human 
spirit; a freedom to venture out in the exploration of new frontiers of 
possibility giving life new direction, purpose and meaning. In the 
academic world this new hopeful face can be seen in those who 
have taken the collapse of a universal rational certainty as the cue 
for the systematic development of fresh rational accounts of human 
experience that will provide new frameworks of meaning and 
purpose for human life. According to Fowler, we might think in this 
connection of such names as Gadamer, Rorty, Habermas and 
Derrida. A superficial reading of their works, especially of de-
constructionists15 like Derrida, can leave the impression that they 
provide academic foundation for the culture of hopelessness 
described by the critics of postmodernism. A more careful reading, 
however, makes it clear that what they are aiming to do is to destroy 
the last vestiges of hope in the rational certainties of the modern 
world as a basis for a meaningful, purposeful life, so that they may 
replace it with a radically new basis for giving hope and meaning to 
human life (Fowler, 2004:54-55). 
5. Developments in secular philosophy and sociology of 
science 
5.1  The piecemealists: emergence of a dialectic, and a new 
synthesis 
According to Fuller (1993:101), scholars began searching for the 
middle ground, i.e. between the optimistic “continuous growth” view 
of science held by positivists and empiricists, and Kuhn’s view of 
“normal science” intermittently broken by periods of “crisis” and 
“revolution”. The search for the middle ground, says Fuller, often 
takes the form of a dialectical synthesis: 
The first moment of this would-be dialectic was when the 
positivists suggested that scientific knowledge is distinguished 
by some metric of continuous growth, such as the steady 
accumulation of facts or the subsumation of more phenomena 
under fewer laws. The second moment was provided by 
Thomas Kuhn, who claimed that the most important changes in 
                                      
15 A full discussion of each of these new frameworks goes beyond the scope of 
this discussion. Also cf. Fowler (2004:55 ff). 
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science were radically discontinuous, indeed a revolutionary 
transition between incommensurable paradigms. The putative 
synthesis, then, is to say that there are some local 
discontinuities between successive paradigms, but that these 
are not incompatible with net epistemic growth in the long run. 
Barrow (1999:60 ff.) uses the metaphor of archaeologists who 
discover the building blocks of a huge structure under the sand to 
explain this would-be dialectic. Positivists thought that science was 
cumulative: scientists discover more and more truths about the 
world. The realisation that this picture of science was naive, and that 
sometimes scientists abandoned earlier views as mistaken, did not 
really alter the basic optimism of the positivist. It was said that earlier 
scientific theory was only abandoned in order to put a better theory 
in its place (Mautner, 2000:300). 
To explain the dialectic or putative synthesis between the ideas of 
cumulative growth and Kuhn’s view of normal science interrupted by 
periods of crisis and revolution, a metaphor used by Otto von 
Neurath was revived. Neurath, one of the members of the Vienna 
Circle, had used the metaphor of a boat on the open sea already as 
far back as 1921 in his publication entitled Anti-Spengler (1973). The 
metaphor was revived in recent times by others such as Quine 
(1953), Lievers (2003:150) and Godfrey-Smith (2003:30; cf. also 
Fuller, 1993:101, and Blackburn, 1996:259) to explain the idea that 
science was cumulative but that the accumulation was piecemeal. 
According to Neurath (1973:198-199) 
… we are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct 
their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. 
Where a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put 
there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this 
way, by using the old beams and driftwood, the ship can be 
shaped entirely anew, but only by gradual construction. 
This image, as well as Laudan’s (1984) of reticulation, contributes to 
the idea that the body of scientific knowledge is an inert creature 
broken up into parts of just the right size to be taken up for separate 
inspection. According to the piecemealists, one such part, say a 
theory or a method, can be examined, contested, and even 
substantially changed, while the rest of the corpus remains intact in 
the background (Fuller, 1993:101). Exponents of this piecemealist 
view still regard themselves as continuists. According to Foucault 
(1996:103), to recognise a discontinuity is never anything more than 
to register a problem that needs to be solved. 
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Fuller (1993:102) had two problems with the ideas of the piece-
mealists:  
• Has every part of the main corpus of scientific knowledge been 
formally introduced for consideration; has every part of our 
existing body of knowledge been explicitly added at some point in 
history, and can it therefore, if the scientific community sees fit, 
be removed at some point in the future?  
• Does the part of our body of knowledge that has been placed in 
the background while we consider a specific part not itself 
changed as a result of disagreements between scientists about 
the part under scrutiny?  
The piecemealists’ views amount to “a strong version of social 
antirealism, for these views suggest that no change has been 
brought about in the scientific corpus until the change has been 
recognized as such by the scientific community”. He regards 
Laudan’s (1984) “consensualist theory of validation” as a good 
example of such social antirealism (Fuller, 1993:103). 
Fuller (1993:104), however, accepts the ideas of the piecemealists 
when it comes to the phenomenology of scientific change. But that, 
according to him, accounts only for how scientific revolutions are 
perceived, and not for how they actually occur. In his opinion, 
scientific change happens as it were subliminally, and by the time 
the change is realised, it has become fully irreversible (cf. Fuller, 
1993:104-106 for a detailed description of how Fuller himself views 
scientific change). His view of scientific change is an “elaboration of 
Kuhn’s talk of invisible scientific revolutions”. In his opinion, the 
piecemealists seem to have been oblivious of the fact that change 
can occur in the body of knowledge that is in the “background” or 
“below the surface” when a part of the existing knowledge is being 
analysed, discussed and debated (Fuller, 1993:106). 
5.2 Scientific magpies, social constructivists and other 
postmodern developments  
The most recent two or three decades of doing science world-wide 
have also been characterised by a synthetic or magpie approach to 
theory construction (Sim & Van Loon, 2005:6 ff.). This approach has 
been characterised by the fact that scientists tend to fit bits and 
pieces of various theories together in order to perform scientific 
tasks. According to Sim and Van Loon (2005:7 ff.; 117 ff.), “[e]xcept 
for the most committed enthusiasts of particular movements, most 
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critics tend to operate in magpie fashion these days, selecting a bit 
of this theory and a bit of that for their own personalized approach”. 
The mere presence of many competing theories makes this 
possible. 
Our view of modern science is further complicated by the application 
of many new metaphors (cf. Neurath’s boat, the piecemeal 
approach, the magpie approach, alluded to already). Other 
metaphors that are being bandied about are that theories tend to 
grow like “rhizomes”, in other words they expand like communication 
networks, and each follows its own direction, even beyond 
recognised authority structures; that science is (or rather should be) 
“nomadic” (Van der Hoeven, 1995:56), in other words not bound to 
any rules, authority or any particular theoretical or thought system. It 
knows no boundaries.16
Science is not seen any more as one thing, it is many. People have 
become more open-minded about what science might be, and they 
are prepared to entertain alternative visions of science (Fuller, 
1997:8-9). It is not closed, but open to new approaches. Objections 
to novelty and to alternatives come from particular groups with 
vested interests, not from science as a whole. It is therefore possible 
to gain understanding and to solve problems by combining bits and 
pieces of science with prima facie unscientific opinions and 
procedures. Purely theoretical subjects have profited from foreign 
invasions from other disciplines. One can even succeed by 
altogether staying outside science. Numerous non-scientific cultures 
supported their members materially and spiritually. True, says 
Feyerabend (2005:852), they ran into difficulties – but so did 
science-based Western civilisation. The old antagonism between 
theory and practice and the related antagonism between scientific 
and unscientific approaches may still survive in practice, or in some 
archaic slogans; however, it has lost much of its philosophical bite. 
It is clear from the preceding discussion, that the magpie approach 
can be regarded as a departure from what O’Loughlin (1999:49) 
                                      
16 The “Sokal scandal” in 1996 was an example of this tendency (Macey, 
2001:358). Sokal claimed that pi was not a constant, and therefore not a 
universally applicable factor. Its value relies on the observer, and is therefore, 
unavoidably subject to historicism (Sim & Van Loon, 2005:13-14). In his own 
words: “My original motivation had to do with epistemic relativism. It seems to 
me that a sloppily thought-out relativism has become the unexamined Zeitgeist 
in large sectors of the American humanities and some parts of the social 
sciences” (Sokal, 2003:56). 
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called the scientistic paradigm. The scientistic “view from nowhere” 
(decontextualisation), the search for objective truth and neutrality 
are being relinquished in favour of views of knowledge as 
(embodied) discursive practice, voice and standpoint 
epistemologies.17 According to her,  
... as social circumstances have changed across the globe and 
as we come to understand that simplistic accounts of 
knowledge as either subjective or objective are not only 
inaccurate but dangerous, then research epistemologies which 
acknowledge subjectivity while at the same time accept that 
subjectivity itself must be constrained by regulative realism (the 
acknowledgement of the material world and its processes) then 
I think we can continue on the path of re-mapping the epistemic 
terrain in ... research in the human sciences (O’Louglin, 
1999:57). 
Fuller (2000:xv), a self-declared social constructivist, contends that 
social constructivists need to maintain a “strategic allegiance” with 
their “main foes” the piecemealists, since neither group believes in 
the independent reality of the social world, which explains why each 
in its own way is oblivious to the unintended consequences of 
human action, the alienation of reason from the reasoner, and the 
latent functions of apparently irrational practices – “all staples of 
macrosociological theory of every possible ideological stripe, 
ranging from classical political economy through Marx and 
Durkheim, down to contemporary American, French, British and 
German structural-functionalism” (Fuller, 1993:103). 
What we have mentioned so far under the heading Magpies and 
social constructivists can arguably be construed as postmodern(ist), 
i.e. post-scientistic, approaches. Postmodernism itself is, however, 
difficult to define. The term postmodernism has become highly 
meaning-inflated and equivocal (cf. Bezuidenhout, 2005:4). Post-
modernism seems to be sceptical about the notion of progress and 
of grand-scale solutions to problems, but at the same time, says 
Bezuidenhout, one of the most self-confident political projects, neo-
liberalism, seems still to reign sovereign with its faith in an 
unrestricted market economy. Certain scientistic approaches to 
science and scholarship such as empiricism are also still alive and 
                                      
17 A standpoint or voice epistemology is a philosophical position that advocates 
starting research from the perspective of those, such as blacks, women, the 
poor, gays and lesbians, who tend to be oppressed in the society in which they 
find themselves, or the society in which the research is taking place. 
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well. In Bezuidenhout’s opinion, the age of postmodernism has in 
fact come and gone, possibly because of 9/11. The puzzling 
question is now: what can we expect in its place?  
Bezuidenhout has no name yet for the new approach to life in 
general, and to knowledge construction (research, science, 
scholarship) in particular that is beginning to emerge. In his opinion, 
the new approach is characterised by cynicism. Humankind is 
portrayed as being in such a hopeless state that one would think 
that it can only be saved by becoming extinct as a species. Western 
culture, for instance, is not being attacked by barbarians from the 
outside, but is indeed dying from the inside like a body racked with 
cancer.  
This dissolution of identity is reinforced by the perception that we 
find ourselves in the “depths of a cultural winter”, characterised by 
social constructivism, disbelief in the “progress myth”, renouncement 
of the nostalgia for a total scheme of things, a continuing 
commitment to human autonomy, a consumer culture with regards 
to religions and worldviews, a collapse of modernity, the decentered 
self – a subject with no substance – and the “nomadic home-
lessness” of modern people (Middleton & Walsh, 1995:12-13; 25, 
31-33, 35, 41-84; also cf. Geelen, 2005). 
Furedi (2004:19) concludes:  
Our culture continually emphasizes problems that are not 
susceptible to human intervention … Theories of globalization 
stress the inability of people and their nation states to deal with 
forces that are beyond their control. … It is widely believed that 
the world is out of control and that there is little human beings 
can do to master these developments or influence their destiny.  
Rorty (1999:262-263) concurs:  
There is a sense that everything has fallen to pieces, that the 
sociopolitical future of humanity has become utterly unfore-
seeable. People are feeling let down by history, and are 
experiencing self-indulgent, pathetic hopelessness.18
                                      
18 It is interesting to note that, according to Eagleton (2004:54), Rorty himself can 
be seen as an anti-theorist. Anti-theory is a kind of scepticism of theory that is 
itself theoretically interesting. For Rorty, theory is just how you try to justify your 
life; it gives fundamental reasons for what you do. You cannot justify your way of 
life by theory because theory itself is part of that way of life, not something set 
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According to Bezuidenhout (2005:4), we are witnessing a new 
movement:  
Whereas modernism believed in progress, and postmodernism 
questioned the progress myth, people now seem to begin 
wondering whether we have not begun making a U-turn – are 
we not on the way back to what we had left behind? 
5.3 Other current approaches 
According to Feyerabend (2005:852), Kuhn’s work, The structure of 
scientific revolutions, was the last major attempt so far to subject a 
complex practice – science – to abstract thought. Although science 
has been affected by Kuhn’s views on how science worked and 
evolved, older (positivistic and empiristic) approaches are today still 
producing results. The realism/anti-realism/constructivis/empiricism 
debate is as alive as ever, and has received impetus from the 
contributions of Putnam, Van Fraasen, Rorty and others. Still other 
scientists have persisted with “cognitive models of scientific 
knowledge which are naturalistic” (they do not distinguish between 
logical and empirical laws of thought) and based on only partly 
rational patterns of adaptation. Others emphasised details and 
objected to premature generalisations. All these researchers 
appreciate what Kuhn did, but think that his approach is still far too 
abstract. Typical of the magpie approach, they study particular 
events, conduct interviews, invade laboratories, challenge scientists, 
examine their technologies, images, conceptions, and explore the 
often glaring antagonisms between disciplines, schools, and 
individual research groups. Summarising their results, we can say, 
according to Feyerabend (2005:852), that the problem is no longer 
how to articulate the monolith science, but what to do with the 
scattered collection of efforts that has replaced it. Science is no 
more the monolith of rationality (Fuller, 1997:8). 
Apart from all the approaches discussed so far, another plethora of 
approaches to knowledge and the practice of science can be 
mentioned as relevant to the pursuit of scientific knowledge.19 There 
are, for instance, those who tend to work with the so-called power-
knowledge nexus, who show how different knowledge fields are 
                                                                                                              
apart from it. What counts as a legitimate reason or valid idea will be determined 
for you by your way of life itself. 
19 The scope of this overview does not allow a detailed discussion of them. Only a 
few of the most prominent are mentioned. 
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constructed, and how discourses both construct and are constructed 
by political/epistemological moves. In some cases, knowledge is 
deliberately socially contextualised, not only in terms of a discourse 
community, but also in terms of the material conditions underlying 
the whole enterprise of knowledge production, its social utility, and 
the power relations out of which it is produced. In critical studies of 
this nature, knowledge is regarded as a form of social or cultural 
capital: “The knowledge itself must be recognized both within (a 
particular) field of power and in the connections between that 
specific field and more powerful fields of high status as well” (Apple, 
1999:343-345). Among the issues that have been dealt with in 
critical studies are critical gender theory, critical race theory, critical 
theory of social interactions, political economy of urban conditions 
and other areas of major concern, such as marketisation, 
privatisation and the effects of reforms in these areas, much of 
which is guided by ideological commitments that have to be sorted 
through and unpacked (Apple, 1999:345). Studies of this nature 
relate to the different social fields of power in which scholars find 
themselves. 
Harvey (1990:3), in his detailed discussion of critical social research 
methodology, stresses that this approach to social research can be 
distinguished from other forms of knowledge construction in that 
knowledge and critique are deliberately intertwined. “The difference”, 
he says, “between critical approaches and non-critical approaches is 
not the difference between the presence and absence of critique, 
rather it is the difference between approaches in which critique is an 
integral part of the process and those in which it is peripheral”. 
Indeed, he argues, “it is arguable that for a critical methodologist, 
knowledge is critique”. Knowledge is, therefore, a dynamic process, 
and not a static entity. For critical methodologists, knowledge is a 
process of moving towards an understanding of the world and of the 
knowledge which structures one’s perceptions of that world. Critical 
social research, he says, thus aims at an analysis of social 
processes, delving between ostensive and dominant conceptual 
frames, in order to reveal the underlying practices, their historical 
specifity and structural manifestations (Harvey, 1990:3-4). Critical 
social research, he continues, does not take the apparent social 
structure, social processes, or accepted history for granted. It tries to 
dig beneath the surface of appearances. It asks how social systems 
really work, how ideology or history conceals the processes which 
oppress and control people (Harvey, 1990:6). 
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Akin to critical social research, is critical rationalism. It is a school or 
position of twentieth century philosophy, according to Zecha 
(1995:71), which advocates a critical attitude, especially in scientific 
research. The driving force to criticism, says Zecha, is rationality, i.e. 
the readiness to learn from mistakes and false theories. Falsifiability 
or falsification, respectively, are the key notions of the critico-rational 
game in research20 (Zecha, 1994:13). 
Space does not allow coverage of all the modern approaches to 
science. It is worthwhile, however, to note that Higgs (1995) and his 
co-authors regarded the following approaches as relevant to 
research in education in the late 20th century: logical empiricism, 
critical theory, phenomenology, hermeneutics (also cf. Danner, 
1997) and systems theory. Some of these approaches are also 
discussed in a recent book written by Higgs and Smith (2003), such 
as logical empiricism, hermeneutics, systems theory, phenome-
nology and critical theory. Three “new” approaches are, however, 
also mentioned: feminism, African philosophy (also cf. Makgoba, 
1999; Hoppers, 2002; Horn, 2003 and Van der Walt, 2004c), and 
postmodernism. Hung (1997:440 ff.) discusses realism and various 
forms of anti-realism in some detail. 
This brief overview of approaches lends support to Fuller’s (2006:4-
5) conclusion about the understandings of science that we find 
today. According to him, overriding concerns about rationality and 
progress in science as a whole have been replaced by more 
technical analyses of the relationship between evidence and 
inference in particular fields. Lost is an ongoing and wide-ranging 
philosophical debate about the direction that should be given to a 
form of inquiry that could command universal assent. Epistemology 
is now more preoccupied with face-saving exercises to shore up 
expertise, the elusive quest for “credible testimony” and “discipline 
boundary maintenance”.  
5.4 Fuller’s explanation of why secular science developed as 
described above 
Although we now have a picture of how the philosophy and 
sociology of science has developed during the last few decades in 
so-called secular circles, we have to try to fathom exactly why all of 
this happened. Why, for instance, has there been a move away from 
                                      
20 In a sense, this approach is a revival of the philosophies of Karl Popper, Hans 
Albert and Wolfgang Brezinka (cf. Zecha, 1994:11-12). 
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attempting to articulate the monolith science towards a more 
piecemeal, nomadic, magpie and “science as complex” approach, in 
which social constructivism seems to have become the preferred 
scientific method? 
Fuller (2000:xv) offers an explanation. In the 1970’s, the latest 
trending was to be highly critical of any number of taken-for-granted 
beliefs that scientists might hold, thereby opening the door to 
alternative ways of being and thinking. The odd man out at the time 
was Kuhn, who not only failed to privilege criticism, but actually went 
so far as to argue (in Structure) that it should be avoided at all costs 
until a line of inquiry is saddled with so many unsolved empirical 
problems that it is forced to ask critical questions about the 
phenomenological foundations of the entire enterprise. Towards the 
end of the 20th century, this acritical perspective of Kuhn’s has 
colonised the academy. The progeny of Kuhn’s incisive 
philosophical critics now suppose the basic truth of his account of 
science, with the result that the radical scepticism of deconstruction 
has now yielded to a postmodern pluralism that offends only by 
opening its doors to too many perspectives – courtesy of Kuhn.21 
The critical turn of mind has become so alien to philosophy and 
sociology of science that it has itself become a fit subject for 
anthropological (and even taxidermic!) studies. Kuhn’s Structure 
helped to level disciplinary hierarchies and overturn inappropriate 
methodological standards, thereby contributing to the climate of 
pluralism that (at least for the time being), continues to flourish in 
most systems of higher education in the West (Fuller, 2000:3). 
In Fuller’s critical opinion of Kuhn’s contribution to our understanding 
of the history and sociology of science, Kuhn’s Structure can be 
tagged as “the consummate postmodernist work”: 
The cross-disciplinary appeal (of the work) is founded on its 
ability to compel readers without demanding too much 
engagement in return. It is not a master narrative but a servant 
narrative that is indefinitely adaptable to the user’s wishes. 
                                      
21 Kuhn’s theory influenced the thinking of Feyerabend and Lakatos, and 
structuralist theories of science also show such influence. His ideas also had 
enormous impact in individual disciplines, especially the humanities (Hoyningen-
Huene, 1993:xix-xx). According to Hung (1997:390), Kuhn’s theory has had a 
tremendous impact in the philosophy of science. “It was instrumental,” he says, 
“in dislodging the classical tradition from the central stage. Indeed, its influence 
has spread far and beyond: well into fields such as general philosophy, 
psychology, sociology, education, and the historiography of science.” 
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Although the death of the grand narrative (a vivid name for 
“philosophical history”) and the rise of relativism are usually 
associated with Jean-Francois Lyotard (1924-1998) and allied 
French thinkers, Kuhn’s stylistic achievement was to ease not 
only humanists and social scientists, analytic philosophers, and 
other congenital Francophobes into a postmodern mindset 
(Fuller, 2000:31). 
Fuller (2000:xvi; 2006:4, 17) believes that Kuhn’s Structure has influ-
enced science, as well as the history, philosophy and sociology of 
science, for the worse. Fuller is not without hope, however. As a 
devout social constructivist, he believes that  
even disappointment (in the post-Kuhnian developments) can 
be used strategically to point out better paths that were 
originally not taken, but (with some adjustment) can be taken up 
in the future. 
In contrast with Kuhn’s thesis that history “can be done only of 
periods and episodes whose defining debates have now reached 
closure, because the terms of the debates have been either 
resolved or superseded”, Fuller believes that other avenues can be 
explored, and alternative perspectives constructed – if not in a 
piecemeal manner, then at least gradually (cf. Neurath’s boat 
metaphor). 
6. Preliminary conclusion 
This then is where we stand with developments in the sphere of so-
called secular philosophy and sociology of science at the beginning 
of the 21st century. We shall return in section 3 (towards the end of 
the second part of this article) to the three problems outlined by 
Moore (cf. section 1 above) and the two aims of this discussion 
(section 2 above) when we draw a number of general conclusions 
based on this meta-analysis. At this point, however, we can 
conclude that secular philosophy of science and scholarship has 
been unmasked both from within and without as having surrendered 
the positivistic and scientistic search for a stable universal 
foundation of science, an optimistic cumulative view of science, and 
for universal absolute certainty. It now seems to favour diverse 
searches for contingent foundations, “credible testimony”, “discipline 
boundary maintenance”, social constructivism, postmodern pluralism 
and fallibilism, all of which tend to result in the magpie and other 
piecemeal approaches inclined to seeing theories as flexible 
formulations that can be plied and used to suit particular situations. 
In brief, modern secular science seems to be characterised by 
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secularism, postmodern fragmentation and a preference for 
contingent foundations. The members of the secular community of 
scholars indeed perceive the bastion of modern science to have 
been under attack. They realise that it is in crisis; a new paradigm 
has not yet begun to take shape.  
In the second part of this article, developments in Christian 
philosophy and sociology of science will be tracked and conclusions 
will be drawn with reference to the tasks outlined by Moore for 
Christian scholarship. In the process, we shall see how it tries to 
deal with the three characteristics of modern secular science just 
mentioned. 
List of references 
APPLE, M. 1999. What counts as legitimate knowledge? The social production 
and the use of reviews. Review of Educational Research, 69(4):343-346.  
BARBOUR, I.G. 1997. Religion and science: historical and contemporary 
issues. San Francisco: Harper. 
BARROW, J.D. 1999. Impossibility: the limits of science and the science of 
limits. London: Vintage. 
BEZUIDENHOUT, A. 2005. Postmodern – of terug in skubbe? Rapport 
Perspektief: 4, 13 Nov. 
BLACKBURN, S. 1996. Dictionary of philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
COLLINS CONCISE DICTIONARY. 1999. Glasgow: Harper Collins. 
DANNER, H., ed. 1997. Hermeneutics and educational discourse. 
Johannesburg: Heinemann. 
DE RUYTER, D. 1994. Op weg naar een nieuwe staatspedagogiek? (On the 
way to a new form of state pedagogics?) (In Miedema, S. & Klifman, H. 
Christelijk onderwijs in ontwikkeling. (Christian education in process.) 
Kampen: Kok. p. 23-29.) 
EAGLETON, T. 2004. After theory. London: Penguin Books. 
FEYERABEND, P.K. 2005. History of the philosophy of science. (In Honderich, 
T., ed. The Oxford companion to philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. p. 849-852.) 
FOUCAULT, M. 1996. Questions of method. (In Baynes, K., Bohman, J. & 
McCarthy, T. Philosophy: end or transformation? Cambridge: MIT. p. 95-
117.) 
FOWLER, S. 2002. The Christian professional called to the service of love. 
Melbourne: Amani Educational Services. 
FOWLER, S. 2004. Rationality, certainty and education in a postmodern world. 
African Journal for Transformational Scholarship, 1(2):43-64. 
FULLER, S. 1993. Philosophy of science and its discontents. New York: 
Guilford Press. 
FULLER, S. 1997. Science: concepts in the social sciences. Buckingham: Open 
University Press. 
FULLER, S. 2000. Thomas Kuhn: a philosophical history for our times. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Koers 71(2, 3, 4) 2006:397-422  419 
“The unmasking of modern science” – the sequel (I)  
FULLER, S, 2006. Kuhn vs. Popper. Cambridge: Icon Books. 
FUREDI, F. 2004. Revolution, but not in my name. Sunday Times: 19, 21 
March.  
GEELEN, F. 2005. School is primair wat leraar ervan maakt. (School is primarily 
what the teacher makes of it.) SBM-Maandblad van de Besturenraad voor 
Managers, Bestuurders en Toezichthouders, (7):6-7. 
GODFREY-SMITH, P. 2003. Theory and reality. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
HARVEY, L. 1990. Critical social research. London: Unwin Hyman. 
(Contemporary Social Research series, no. 21.) 
HIGGS, P., ed. 1995. Metatheories in philosophy of education. Johannesburg: 
Heinemann. 
HIGGS, P. & SMITH, J. 2003. Rethinking truth. Landsdowne: Juta. 
HONDERICH, T., ed. 2005. The Oxford companion to philosophy. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
HOPPERS, C.A.O., ed. 2002. Indigenous knowledge and the integration of 
knowledge systems. Claremont: New Africa Books. 
HORN, I.H. 2003. Traditional religion, Western religious shifts and con-
temporary education. Journal for Christian Scholarship, 39(3 & 4):51-66. 
HOYNINGEN-HUENE, P. 1993. Reconstructing scientific revolutions. Thomas 
S. Kuhn’s philosophy of science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
HUNG, E-C. 1997. The nature of science: problems and perspectives. Belmont: 
Wadsworth. 
JANSEN, J. 2006. Is evidence overrated? Quest, 2(3):33-35.  
KLAPWIJK, J. 1987. Reformational philosophy on the boundary between the 
past and the future. Philosophia Reformata, 52:101-134. 
KUHN, T.S. 1970. Reflections on my critics. (In Lakatos, I. & Musgrave, A. 
Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. p. 231-278.) 
KUHN, T.S. 1973. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
KUHN, T.S. 2000.The road since Structure. Conant, J. & Haugeland, J., eds. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
LAKATOS, I. & MUSGRAVE, A. Criticism and the growth of knowledge. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
LAUDAN, L. 1984. Science and values. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
LEEDY, P.D. & ORMROD, J.E. 2005. Practical research, planning and design. 
Upper Saddle River: Pearson. 
LIEVERS, M. 2003. WVO Quine. (In Doorman, M. & Pott, H. Filosofen van deze 
tijd. Amsterdam: Bakker. p. 137-152.) 
MACEY, D. 2000. The Penguin dictionary of critical theory. London: Penguin. 
MAKGOBA, M.W. 1999. African Renaissance: the new struggle. Cape Town: 
Mafube. 
MARSDEN, G.M. 1997. The outrageous idea of Christian scholarship. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
MASTERMAN, M. 1970. The nature of a paradigm. (In Lakatos, I. & Musgrave, 
A. Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. p. 59-90.) 
MAUTNER, T. 2000. Dictionary of philosophy. London: Penguin. 
McCARTHY, R., OPPEWAL, D., PETERSON, W. & SPYKMAN, G. 1981. 
Society, state and schools. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 
420   Koers 71(2, 3, 4) 2006:397-422 
 J.L. van der Walt 
MIDDLETON, J.R. & WALSH, B.J. 1995. Truth is stranger than it used to be. 
Downers Grove: InterVarsity. 
MOORE, T.M. 1982. Study: the unmasking of modern science. Potchefstroom: 
Clearing House of the International Conferences for Christian Higher 
Education. Circular, 27:69-92, Jul.  
NEURATH, O. 1973. Anti-Spengler. (In Neurath, M. & Cohen, R.S., eds. 
Empiricism and sociology. Dordrecht: Reidel. p. 158-213.) 
O’LOUGHLIN, M. 1999. New research epistemologies in a changing social 
landscape. Education as change, 3(1):48-58. 
O’LOUGHLIN, M. 2000. Narrative research methodology. Education as change, 
4(1):55-62. 
PLANTINGA, A. 1995. Christian philosophy at the end of the 20th century. (In 
Griffioen, S. & Balk, B. Christian philosophy at the close of the twentieth 
century: assessment and perspective. Kampen: Kok. p. 29-53.) 
QUINE, W.V.O. 1953. From a logical point of view. New York: Harper & Row. 
RORTY, R. 1999. Philosophy and social hope. London: Penguin. 
SIM, S. & VAN LOON, B. 2005. Introducing critical theory. Royston: Icon Books. 
SOKAL, A. 2003. Science and relativism. (In Baggini, J. & Stangroom, J. What 
philosophers think. London: Continuum. p. 55-64.) 
VAN DEN BEUKEL, A. 2000. Natuurwetenschap en geloof: vuur en water? (In 
Van Kampen, P.J., red. Christendom onwys: 15 wetenschappers over 
God, geloof en wetenschap. Kampen: Voorhoeve. p. 10-24.) 
VAN DER HOEVEN, J. 1995. Christian philosophy at the end of the 20th 
century. (In Griffioen, S. & Balk, B., eds. Christian philosophy at the close 
of the 20th century. Kampen: Kok. p. 55-66.) 
VAN DER WALT, B.J. 1994. The liberating message. Potchefstroom: Institute 
for Reformational Studies. 
VAN DER WALT, B.J. 2003. Identiteit en relevansie. (Identity and relevance.) 
Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap, 39(3 & 4):131-148. 
VAN DER WALT, B.J. 2004a. Sekularisme: die gees van ons tyd – ’n 
bedreiging. (Secularism: the spirit of our times – a threat.) Tydskrif vir 
Christelike Wetenskap, 40(1 & 2):85-98. 
VAN DER WALT, B.J. 2004b. Sekularisme: die gees van ons tyd II. 
(Secularism: the spirit of our times II.) Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap, 
40(3 & 4):93-116. 
VAN DER WALT, B.J. 2004c. Knowledge different from merely the analytica? 
The Western way of thinking versus the Eastern and African mode of 
thought. Koers, 69(4):661-696. 
ZECHA, G., ed. 1994. Critical rationalism and educational discourse. 
Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
ZECHA, G. 1995. Critical rationalism and education. (In Higgs, P., ed. 1995 








Koers 71(2, 3, 4) 2006:397-422  421 
“The unmasking of modern science” – the sequel (I)  
Key concepts:  















422   Koers 71(2, 3, 4) 2006:397-422 
